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What’s wrong with the world? Rationality!  




ABSTRACT:  Jean Gebser (1905-1973) was a multidisciplinary thinker 
whose ideas about human consciousness and the future inspire the fo llowing 
five vantage points for the heterodox critique of contemporary economic 
anthropology: (1) Characteristic attributes of consciousness and those of the 
environment surrounding the individual are equivalent, eliminating the 
possibility of single-minded, seamless, rational control, especially during 
macrohistoric phase transitions; (2) Diaphaneity as a mode of deep and 
comprehensive understanding will be needed to deal effectively with 
emerging global resource and environmental problems; (3) Costs in the form 
of irreversibly accumulating inaccessible energy shadow economic expansion 
that our cultural conditioning portrays as pure progress; (4) Rationality, as the 
most laudable motivation for individuals, business firms and nations, has led 
to an unfounded techno-fetish; and, for various reasons, it fuels accelerated 
movement toward collective self-destruction; (5) Signs of chaos (not the 
harmless and controllable kind found in standard economic literature) 
corroborate the notion that we have entered a new period of macrohistoric 
phase transition as interpreted by the thermodynamic comprehension o f 
universal history.  
 
Jean Gebser (1905-1973), considerably better known in his native “Mittel Europa” than 
in the Atlantic world, relied on natural and social sciences, as well as on the arts and 
humanities, to formulate a compelling phenomenology of consciousness. It appears to be 
increasingly pertinent to the world’s inexorable awakening to the physical limits that face 
human drives in the aggregate.     
 
He identified five structures of consciousness: Archaic, magic, mythical, mental, and 
integral. These have always been simultaneously and comprehensively present in all of 
us with a crucial qualification: Historically, they dominate actual consciousness in the 
sequence indicated. Although with nonnegligible overlaps, each emerged, became 
decisively influential, turned deficient and was gradually replaced in its epoch-defining 
capacity. Currently, we live the apotheosis of mental dominance, already in its deficient 
phase, struggling to ward off the fifth (integral) structure, which began to press to the 
fore at the turn of the last century.  
 
An originary perception of existence is “ever-present” in consciousness.1 It had become 
suppressed and latent over the ages but once the integral structure defines our 
relationship to “Being” it will be free again, renewed and enriched with transparency and 
intensity. This final, culminating moment of consonance will usher in the age of a healthy 
                                                 
1 Gebser’s magnum opus, “The Ever-present Orig in,” is a skillful t ranslation of the original German t itle 
“Ursprung und Gegenwart.”  
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equilibrium among basic human propensities. The archaic deep sleep and relaxation, the 
magic sense of unity; experienced, among many other ways, through music; fulfillment 
of poetic inclinations that characterizes the mythical, and the cultivation of sciences that 
the mental in us urges, will all have their opportunity to flourish.    
 
Gebser did not want to be honored as a wise-hearted seer or guru. He never acted as a 
counselor of “correct” behavior and would most certainly consider it a practical joke if he 
had found a sticker to this effect pasted on his legacy. He emphasized that life cannot be 
fundamentally different from what we understand to be the human condition. 
Nonetheless, he maintained that the integral structure would give the individual the best 
chance of self- realization and should generally improve the quality of life. Remarkably, 
integral consciousness translates into interpersonal relations at all levels of social 
organization that would be perfectly compatible with long-term, world-embracing 
sustainability.  
 
Since any attempt to do justice to Gebser’s oeuvre (including the criticism directed at it) 
would overwhelm the present undertaking, what follows is intended only to demonstrate 
why the heterodox approach to contemporary socioeconomic issues finds support and 
inspiration in his thoughts.2 In particular, the following five Gebserian insights brought 
into contemporary economic context remind us of how unfit “mainstream” is to absorb 
and reflect the emerging new reality; how irrelevant and aporia-promoting its 
hypertrophied abstractions and atomized preoccupations have become.        
 
(1) Characteristic attributes of consciousness and those of the environment surrounding 
the individual are equivalent, eliminating the possibility of single-minded, seamless, 
rational control during macrohistoric phase transitions (chaotic transitions3); (2) 
Diaphaneity as a mode of deep and comprehensive understanding (an approach that 
excludes latching on to any particular, “either/or” type of explanation, perspective, or 
Oedipal macro-narrative) will be needed to deal effectively with global resource and 
environmental problems; (3) Costs in the form of irreversibly accumulating inaccessible 
energy shadows global economic expansion that our cultural conditioning portrays as 
pure progress; (4) Rationality, as the deficient phase of the mental structure, fuels 
accelerated movement toward self-destruction; (5) Signs of chaos (not the plain vanilla 
kind found in standard economic literature) corroborate the notion that we have entered 
the period of a new chaotic transition.           
 
(1) The intangibly conscious interior and the tangible exterior are, to a large extent, each 
other’s reflections.      
 
In this respect, Gebserian thought confirms (and is confirmed by) perhaps the most 
remarkable achievement of 20th century Western philosophy. Structuralism and post-
                                                 
2
 The reader who wants to become better acquainted with Gebser is referred to his two best known works 
listed in References. Feuerstein (1987) provides a complete exegesis and Combs (1996) includes an 
excellent summary.  
3
 Chaotic transition is a cataclysmic macrohistoric gestation that ushers in a new global era. See later in the 
text and in the Appendix. 
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structuralism (or postmodernism) finished what Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, 
Saussure, Wittgenstein and many others began, namely downsizing, and perhaps even 
abandoning, the conviction that a Cartesian-cogito- like, background-independent subject 
can make an objective, value-free sense of the world.     
 
Consciousness cannot possibly live a life independent from the specifics in which it is 
born and develops. Surrounding socioeconomic milieus are fused with thoughts, feelings; 
traditions and culture, with a temporal Weltanschauung. In short, we think and behave the 
way the world is and the world is the way we think and behave. The consequent 
statistical equivalence between what one may consider average consciousness and the 
typical external matrix results in a structure of understanding that is manifest in profound, 
stability-preserving beliefs about what is natural, normal, desirable, and achievable. 4 
 
This condition governs even erudition although it does so inconspicuously. Standard 
knowledge is not merely an accumulation of scholarly contributions by outstanding 
individuals. It is also a congenerous reverberation symptomatic of where the evolving 
interior/exterior equivalence happens to be along the macrohistoric timescale. But this 
second feature -- the temporality of epistemological awareness -- remains largely 
concealed both from those who are engaged in scientific endeavors and the general 
public.    
 
The academic centers of 16th century Europe were dominated by big-wig theologians 
who provided advice on how to ensure general welfare by recognizing and eliminating 
Satanic influences. “Graduate students” in search of lucrative careers specialized in 
demonology, wrote dissertations in flawless Latin on the punctum diabolicum and 
maleficium. All that intellectual effort, ambition, and brilliance, all the honor that had 
been bestowed upon these pursuits! And yet, the whole enterprise became the laughing 
stock of scholars by the end of the 17th century and the Enlightenment relegated it to the 
absurd proto-history of modern mentality.    
 
The overwhelming force of radical presence thwarts the application of such thoughts to 
prevailing conditions. As during every past epoch, what “is” now appears to be all that 
life can be; all that is “true.” Orthodoxy is insensitive to, and subtly sidetracks deviations 
that threaten it. Its entrenchment remains resilient even when the passage of time thrusts 
new conditions onto the stage of history, rendering its worldview and methodology 
increasingly obsolete and irrelevant. It can do so by thriving on the resistance against the 
unfamiliar, against upsetting the learned, institutionalized ways in which ends and means 
can be connected in daily life.       
 
Epochal transformation is a mysterious and tortuous journey. Recognition that rules and 
principles for the whole (the world) are different from what may be applicable to the 
                                                 
4
 Average consciousness presumes that individual consciousnesses have either common general features 
(e.g., h igher income is better than lower income) or common attributes of varying intensity (e.g ., desire to 
consume luxuries). Similar th inking constructs and maintains the “typical exterior,” i.e.; the social and 
economic characteristics of the milieu in which the indiv idual strives for differential success.  
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parts (nations, political movements, business firms, individuals) could come only after 
the mist arising from the clash of wills is dispersed.   
 
Since the way a comprehensive change occurs at the global scale cannot be called a 
rational process (at least not ex ante) nor can it be called an irrational one (it is 
rationalizable ex post), it ought to be characterized as “arational.”               
 
The acknowledgment that light is both wave and a stream of corpuscles exemplifies 
arational propositions. While the rational mind insists that things must be either this or 
that, the arational approach accepts two (perhaps even more) facets of a single truth. And, 
as Gebser frequently pointed out, rather than impairing the individual’s ability, the 
cultivation of arational proclivities enhances creativity.5 
 
Accepting the internal/external equivalence translates into welcoming the necessity to 
participate in the social process by making and advocating choices, while understanding 
that all of us (and all the time) are involved in an endogenously-organized collective 
motion at the species’ level, which eludes any individual or partial, selectively rational 
control. The future is an upshot (rather than a conscious synthesis) of conflicting ideas 
and blueprints. This is especially the case during chaotic transitions at the global scale, 
for which there have been only two complete examples: “1789-1834” and “1914-1945.” 
(The Appendix briefly describes a new macrohistoric theory that depicts the past half 
millennium as a slow -- at least from the human observer’s vantage point -- 
thermodynamic alteration between dynamic steady states -- called global systems -- and 
chaotic transitions.)    
 
The unity between what is internal and external has a material basis. The brain contains 
both the information about the institutional aspects of the environment and the 
information about how to deal with them in an endless variety of “behavior-provoking” 
situations. 
 
These individually anchored and physically conceivable traces are interconnected (again 
in physically interpretable ways) into a worldwide network under the reign of a global 
system. The latter can be visualized as a single physical object, a complicated lattice with 
billions of individual nodes in the service of a historically valid scheme of coordination 
equilibrium. It may be called the global system-specific integrated web.  
 
(2) Diaphaneity, seeing through it all. 
  
                                                 
5
"Arationality" intrigued some of the most memorable figures of twentieth century literature. F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, for example, remarked that intelligence is the ability to accept two contradictory ideas and still 
function. George Orwell discovered the possibility of abusing this faculty. In “1984,” the polit ical tyrant 
uses “doublethink” to perpetuate cognitive dissonance as a method of terror and subjugation. Big Brother 
puzzles and keeps minds paralyzed with slogans such as “war is peace;” with suggestions that the “Inner 
Party” is both infallible and learns from past mistakes. 
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Diaphaneity is a manifestation of the integral, arational consciousness in Gebser’s work. 
It means being in the world according to the way it “really” is, as if it were transparent. 
While the most profound implications are ill-suited for this space, much of his elaboration 
is relevant for the subject at hand.6   
 
What is real? What is the use of contemplating all in one?  
 
These are the two most obvious questions skepticism is likely to prompt. “Real” as a 
comprehensive attribute appears to be an overly subjective notion -- and a mobile, 
evolving, time-dependent one into the bargain -- to be recognized by economists. And 
why bother with the “whole?” Is it not what it is; big, complex, and immeasurable? 
Preoccupation with it belongs to the Café Philosophique.    
 
Answering the above questions differently is part of the critique the current examination 
intends to direct at prevalent interpretations of human nature and cultural evolution in 
economic sciences.  
 
“Seeing through it all” is a social phenomenon that always existed and always will; only 
its contents shift as the external/internal compact develops over time. But after the shift, 
the previous clarity is revealed to be a retrograde, inferior dogma. What seems ontically 
evident in one epoch comes to be regarded as ontologically inadequate in the next. Thus, 
comprehension as inner articulation along with its broadly shared hermeneutic and 
methodological self-awareness is a historical category.   
 
It was perfectly clear to Aristotle and Ptolemy that a stationary Earth is the center of the 
universe. If the Earth moved, they argued, we would feel the breeze. Were the cosmic 
center located on the Sun or on some other heavenly body, the earthenware plate dropped 
by the slave would fall toward the hypothesized center rather than to the kitchen floor. 
Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton helped see “through it all” differently, and, one 
may say, more correctly.7       
 
Similarly, the crystallized socioeconomic order is inconspicuously present in the 
interstices of most minds. It can always be characterized a-historically in its defense. It 
excludes both what was common sense, phenomenally confirmed experience in the past 
and what it may be in the future. The prevalent global system keeps churning out standard 
(or kindred) responses and opinions, regardless of the infinite variety in value-and-belief-
judgment prompting instances. The vast majority of the myriad assertions in daily life are 
derivatives of the extant-dominant diaphaneity. The parade brings ever newer and more 
surprising spectacles but the approving applause of the spectators remains the same.  
 
                                                 
6
 Gebser used the pietistically -tainted word “spiritual” to describe diaphaneity. Yet, he characterized 
“spirit” as a psychic phenomenon, the power of transformation, and primordial energy (Gebser, 1984, pp.  
229, 326, and 330).    
7
 Professor Emeritus Kent Nielsen of Brigham Young University elaborated on the transformation of core 
scientific convictions in his featured address to the 40
th
 Annual International Jean Gebser Society 
Conference, Provo, Utah, October 8, 2010.   
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Disguised to the extent of being forgotten, subconsciously stored symbol/referent 
relations speak through the individual. Moving the level of abstraction one notch higher, 
the order of things is a solidly entrenched interconnectedness -- a forward-projecting 
collective will -- lodged into the neuro-anatomy of the global system-specific worldwide 
web.   
 
The typical economics professional of our days seeks success by assuming the much-
extolled sharp focus, the “positive,” engineer- like attitude toward phenomena qua objects 
without any evidence of attempting to understand “pre-analytic” (Schumpeter) notions 
about what constitutes reality. Highly specialized individuals, who cannot possibly find 
the time to read each other’s literature, work within the dispersed spectra of a worldview-
dictated referential context. It may never occur to them that they are extras in an 
imperceptibly slow unfolding, which, over a macrohistoric time scale, punctuates old and 
brings forth new conceptualizations. For example, labor unions were nonexistent during 
GS0, a social plague and police matter under GS1, but a required component of legally 
guided collective bargaining since the instauration of GS2. (See Appendix.) 
 
In our era, education and cultural conditioning impart knowledge of salvation for any and 
all economic problems through market forces, aided by governments within the 
institutional- legal framework of a system called mixed economy/weak multilateralism. 
The Earth as an ecosystem is not considered a long-run constraint to economic growth. 
Neoclassical tradition, which enjoys the upper hand in telling the world what the shape of 
things is (when need arises “to see through it all”) likes to formulate this conviction as a 
dismissal of 19th century “diaphaneity.”   
 
The classics firmly believed that the exhaustion of natural resources, land chief among 
them, would terminate demographic and economic expansion and lead mankind to a 
dismal steady state. But having witnessed the power of entrepreneurship and the marvels 
of science and engineering during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, we now 
“know” that natural constraints do not bind in the long run. Proof: The costs of energy 
and raw materials in developed country GDPs have declined to a small fraction. Aren’t 
things obvious enough?8   
 
The subrealistic diaphaneity of our times (succinctly expressed by quoting the small 
fraction of natural resources in overall expenditures) falters on confusing the “long run” 
with “forever;” on missing the most crucial structural relationship that the next popularly 
embraced diaphaneity must include. Namely, the increase in global output is not a pure 
benefit. It entails increasing global costs; hence, the world economy has a scale limit. The 
teleology of infinitely growing GDP will eventually find its way into textbooks on the 
history of thought. But unlike the harmless ancient belief that the universe is built of fire, 
water, air, and earth, it will be accompanied by the condemning label “self-destructive 
anthropocentric creed.” 
 
                                                 
8
 For a critical view of demoting the significance of natural resources based on the percentage of energy 
and raw material costs in developed country GDPs, see http://www.scribd.com/doc/37932697/A-Critique-
of-Contemporary-Economic-Beliefs. 
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The emerging diaphaneity associated with integral consciousness is likely to accord as 
much merit to describing the Big Picture in qualitative thermodynamic-economic terms 
as furrowing into narrow manholes of extreme specialization. It will constantly urge us to 
go beyond the measurable; to surpass dualistic, center-oriented, one-sided brightness that 
fragmented pursuits and partial results provide. Since it will cultivate an essential 
understanding of the human condition and prospects, perhaps even at the expense of 
pushing specific programs, it will not consider the “indeterminate” (or differences of 
opinion within the “indeterminate”) useless.  
 
Of course, the discovery that a perennial conflict exists between established knowledge 
and the motivation to see through things differently in light of a structural alteration in 
observed phenomena is not new. It has a long and distinguished philosophical ancestry. 
Two brief references follow.  
 
Sensus communis, a concept of Aristotelian origin, recognizes the importance of what 
may be suggested by the absorbance of all available information and the totality of 
aspects.9 Since it grasps reality by going beyond entrenched scholarship, and is nourished 
by the probable and the qualitative as opposed to “in-your- face” quantitative 
examinations within the context of axiomatically accepted, “off- the-peg” knowledge, it 
has always been in conflict with authoritative cathedras.  
 
Hegel was, and his many followers over the past two centuries have remained, staunchly 
critical of “positivism.” Understanding goes beyond standard conceptualization in the 
Hegelian view. It must include speculative, critical, counter-thrusting propositions and 
dialectical reversals. Without them, the object of understanding (e.g., the global system) 
would not even be recognizable; it would remain undisclosed, eluding interpretation.10     
 
The constant scrutiny orthodoxy must encounter flows from the combination of the 
resilience needed for the effectiveness of human self-organization and for preserving its 
capacity to change under pressure. New ideas, better suited to deal with emergent 
conditions challenge senescent ones, first tentatively and unsuccessfully, then with 
growing intensity and relevance, until a new way of seeing through things itself becomes 
an orthodoxy.   
 
Obviously, for the moment, the imperatives that follow from the growing phenomenal 
confirmation of human-activity- induced ecological degradation and emerging energy and 
other resource constraints remain largely disconnected from the imperative to pursue 
output maximization in order to alleviate poverty and to ensure decent living standards 
for the majority of the planet’s population.  
 
                                                 
9 It may seem paradoxical that after d iscarding Aristotle’s astrophysics and chemistry, we need to invoke 
the mighty thinker again when we search for the genesis of the observation that diaphaneity is subject to 
change. Let us ascribe it to a demonstration of the integrative nature of integral consciousness. 
10
 In the chapter entitled “Language as Horizon of a Hermeneutic Ontology,” Gadamer (2003) analyzes 
Hegel and his tradit ion in the ways we interpret understanding.  
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But consciousness is no longer insensitive to the “limits to growth.” Transition to a new 
diaphaneity is unmistakably germinating. Early 20th century philosopher Henri Bergson 
memorably expressed just how subtle the process of collective awakening is. Referring to 
the vast grey area that separates strongly held views, he said that the inchoation of a new 
standpoint begins with “less of a thing thought than a moment of thinking, less a moment 
of thinking than a sensing of direction.”  
 
Abandoning the dogma of eternal economic growth may well be our generation’s 
“inward thought” (to use Alfred North Whitehead’s expression).  
  
(3) Illusion of exaggerated grandeur shadows industrial civilization; humanity misleads 
itself by imputing omnipotence to innovation.   
  
Without disparaging or wanting to live without the amenities of consumer capitalism, 
Gebser had been extremely skeptical to label the advent of the industrial age and 
attendant “technologization” an unadulterated progress. Modernity for Gebser 
represented entry into the deficient phase of the mental structure, a relatively short period 
of universal history during which the world proceeds toward inadvertent self-destruction.   
 
One-sidedly praised gains, which he abstracts into a big push to the intensification of 
consciousness in the wrong direction under the banner of “rationality,” are balanced by 
losses through increasing our distance from the “origin.” The threat comported by the 
general lack of comprehension concerning human existence, inclusive of realistic notions 
about what technology might do for humankind, is on the ascent.11 
 
This view approximates the contention of ecological economists, namely that economic 
activities are not free from negative effects associated with the second law of 
thermodynamics (the entropy law). That every time we add something that benefits 
humanity, we also subtract something from the potential of realizing further benefits -- 
i.e., that aggregation is shadowed by an equal or greater measure of disaggregation -- is a 
blind spot of contemporary economic thinking. An attestation to the validity of the 
observed law of cultural evolution, namely that the prevalent diaphaneity dictates what is 
“right and true,” is that even first water economists continue to insist that “innovation” is 
the ultimate source of wealth.12 The physical environment has been abstracted into a 
nondiminishing standing reserve to serve the satisfaction of human requirements through 
developing and applying “science and technology” which, by its putative independence 
from the state of nature, is presumed to have a limitless horizon.   
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 For a more detailed look at the subject, see my presentation “New scientific evidence confirms Gebser’s 
concerns about technological overreach,” at the 2010 International Gebser Society Conference:  
http://www.gebser.org/downloads/PoganyGebser2010.pdf . 
12
 Baumol (2010) is an eloquent testimony of this neoclassical orthodoxy.  
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If run-of-the-mill economics recognizes “entropy” as worthy of consideration at all, it 
either declares its import for economic sciences null and void or intends to kill the subject 
by using two patently wrong arguments.13 
 
The first one is based on the mistaken notion that the terrestrial sphere constitutes an 
open thermodynamic system and the second on the ill-considered claim that the 
equivalence of energy and mass (per Einsteinian physics) means that shortages in 
material substances can always be eliminated by deploying more energy which, courtesy 
of our Sun, is abundant and practically inexhaustible.   
 
The terrestrial sphere is thermodynamically closed. 
   
Modern thermodynamics distinguishes among three kinds of systems: open, closed, and 
isolated. The open system exchanges both energy and matter with the exterior; the 
isolated exchanges neither. Obviously, the terrestrial sphere is a closed system. Whatever 
we do with matter, incorporating it into our bodies, using it as raw material, discarding 
the bodies, throwing away or reusing matter again and again -- our virtually permanent 
weight and composition of atoms remain constant.  
 
The terrestrial sphere’s substance contains a lump sum of free energy and, for all 
economic intents and purposes our inventory of atoms is fixed. Combining this simple 
fact with the entropy law implies a diminishing availability of free energy contained in 
matter, a lessening ecological order, and a growing confusion about the sphere’s true 
state (per “information entropy”).  
 
Matter and energy may be equivalent in theory but they lack mutual convertibility.   
 
Despite their quantitative equivalence, matter and energy have an important asymmetry. 
While we can produce energy from matter, we lack the technology to do the reverse in 
economically significant quantities. Nor can the readying of energy for worldly 
applications take a detour around matter: The manufacture of solar panels, hydroelectric 
and wind turbines, geothermal stations, and nuclear reactors must draw from the fixed 
number and structural distribution of atoms.  
 
Further, not only energy but matter is also subject to the second law. Deployment of 
matter always entails some irreversible loss of usable molecular structures.  
 
All technological processes, whether in the generation of energy or production of 
material goods, reduce the ratio of economically accessible to total energy (where total 
energy is the sum of accessible or “free” plus inaccessible or “latent” energy14). The 
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 Textbooks on ecological economics deal exp licitly with the second law (e.g., Daly and Farley, 2004; 
Common and Stagl, 2005) and its relevance to the economic process remains a serious research interest. 
See, for example, Jing Chen (2005).   
14
 Energy is regarded “free” as long as accessing it requires fewer joules than what is obtainable from the 
same quantity and qualitative composition of matter. When the similarly interpreted cost/benefit 
relationship turns disadvantageous (i.e ., obtainable joules are below the joules required for access), the 
energy is called “latent.” Conventional (easily accessible) o il and high quality copper are examples of 
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consequences of irrevocable degradation (i.e., the transformation of low entropy 
structures into high entropy ones) remain with us forever. Ultimately, the increasing 
billions of metric tons of matter that the world annually ingests, digests, then extrudes 
back into the very same space whence they come do not leave the ecological status quo 
unchanged.  
 
Mistaken notions about thermodynamics (the physics of the human condition) fuel 
techno-fetish, the belief that nature is infinitely manipulable.  
 
The grand illusion that helps vulgar (nonecological) economic thinking to remove the red 
herring of entropy from discourse resides in a quasi- religious faith in “science and 
technology.” It is a rather naive myth.   
 
The usage of conflating “science” and “technology” into a single meme wrongly equates 
theory with practice. Science refers to solutions on paper, on the computer screen, or in 
labs, while technology means the profitable physical incorporation of “R & D” results. 
The second does not necessarily follow from advancement in the first.    
 
Scientific information is neither free in terms of matter and energy nor is automatically 
translatable into profitable enterprise. Moreover, technological possibilities are not 
independent from the state of matter in the terrestrial sphere and that state changes with 
the growth of human presence and the size of the planet’s economy.  
 
Thinking that free (accessible) energy can be maintained by increasing knowledge is 
tantamount to the claim of having discovered a perpetual motion machine -- the source of 
boisterous merriment in patent offices around the world.  
 
Referring to technological progress, as his generation understood it and as ours continues 
to pursue it, Gebser said “If the destructive might of such progress is not weakened, these 
developments, according to their degree of autonomy will automatically fulfill the law of 
the Earth.” (Gebser, 1984, p. 96.) 
 
Expansion of a species, which in the case of homo sapiens comes with unlimited material 
demands for economic purposes, eventually exhausts the ecological niche that facilitated 
its existence in the first place. The connection ought to be made by now. The 
preoccupation with the environment and natural resource issues that began to grow in the 
early 1970s is a sign that nature, in which we are embedded in an exponentially 
expanding pace, has abandoned its relaxed, permissive stance in favor of an increasingly 
constraining mode.    
 
(4) Rationality: The great catalyst behind overshooting limits   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
materials containing free energy; gasoline fumes and copper ashes exemplify “latent energy.” This 
quantitative relationship cannot be dismissed by citing “technological development.” It implies an absolute 
physical limit, which is totally independent of human knowledge, prices, and general economic conditions.     
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Gebser does not object to rationality as an analytical method or because he prefers its 
opposite, irrationality; or that he urges to attribute more importance to emotion than to 
logic, to place feelings above the intellect, and, consequently, to discourage factual 
reasoning, denigrate specialization, abandon focused investigations and fidelity to 
numerical discipline. His problem is with “rational consciousness,” which, by being 
divisive, lives up to its root word “ratio.” It promotes self-regard to an idealized 
preeminence with claims of anthroposophic completeness.   
 
By colonizing our inner world, rationality has produced a world orientation that comports 
negative effects for both the individual and for society. It limits global integration, and 
uses social sciences to shelter a false and untenable perspective on the future.     
 
Individual and society 
 
The major offshoot of rationality -- collectively defined and culturally ingrained rational 
behavior -- is a shamelessly materialistic (chrematistic) comportment that dispossesses 
individuals of their deeper foundations. Under the banner of freedom and democracy, it 
promotes the profit motive to be the leader among social virtues regardless of the nature 
and size of the business. It blurs the difference between entrepreneurship and competition 
among plumbers, cleaners, and repair shops on local markets with rivalry in an arena 
where, hidden from public view and control, only gigantic financial outfits and 
multinational producers can operate. The much panegyrized benefits of the Invisible 
Hand, a virtual demiurge to neoliberal enthusiasts, are made out to be indivisible between 
realms of activity for which they may be expected to accrue and those for which they are 
not. In the end, rationality as a norm is being used as a blanket to cover the egregious 
concentration of wealth and attended income differentiation within and among nations 
during the past three decades.  
 
The stereotypic, hence widespread, preoccupation with increasing income; or, as it is 
becoming ever more frequently the case, just hanging on to an achieved level of living, 
perpetrates false security. It engenders condescendence towards culture and labels the 
individual’s artistic, contemplative proclivities to be wastefully impractical, idle pursuits.  
 
Less obviously, rational consciousness severely limits or blocks out entire domains of 
reality. By not encouraging the development of freely chosen not- for-profit ways of self-
expression, by implicitly equating docility and altruism beyond myopic reciprocity with a 




“Global problems demand global solutions” may sound like a bombastic platitude from 
the brochure of an ambitious consulting firm, but it is, nonetheless, profoundly true!  
 
If reversing environmental degradation and working out a framework consistent with -- 
let us say -- two centuries of sustainability, the current spirit of international cooperation, 
which may be dubbed rational by virtue of its predication upon immediately perceptible 
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national interests by political societies, will prove to be woefully inadequate. Rational 
consciousness has already revealed its incapacity to locate a generally accepted discount 
factor to calculate the present value of future benefits that are expected to flow from 
investments in environmental and resource sustainability. And while market-based 
environmental analysis and modeling to advise on how to get the “prices right” is a 
booming subfield in economics, there is no shortage of admissions that the international 
community is very far from being able to settle on and live with the consequences of 
agreed upon figures on marginal damages of pollution and associated abetment costs. 15 
No democratically elected government can face its constituents with international deals 
that impair its economic growth and make it appear to have buckled under foreign 
influence or have become brainwashed by some wooly, moist-eyed sloganeering about 
world government.16  
 
The current level and form of global self-organization seems to be morally and mentally 
unequipped to serve the best interests of the species. The force of the “ratio,” which 
keeps the horizon of segmented private interests focused on the short term, is virtually 
intact and the horror scenario of “business as usual” continues to unfold.   
 
This does not mean, of course, that the powers that want to see the world abandon its 
self-destructive course in the name of rational drives are not gaining strength. The 
struggle over cyberspace is a noted testing ground. Rationality, which urges us to find 
profit in every nook and cranny, attempts to chop it up by creating gated subsectors and 
mini-domains while the opposition (e.g., in the form of Wikipedia or MPRA) tends to 
keep it a global public good in the service of developing, storing, and disseminating 
information.  
 
With the spread of enclosing common grazing lands in 19th century Britain, private profit 
motive won big time at the dawn of laissez faire capitalism. Will it succeed again now, 
on the threshold of a new chaotic transition, to fence off, deed and entitle public property 
in conformity with the two-century-old belief that legal exclusion serves the cause of 




Contemporary scholarship, an external reflection of rational consciousnesses, gravitates 
toward mechanically functioning, calculable-predictable systems; it tends to hyper-
sectorize inquiry into an expansive maze of disjointed subfields. Consequent adaptive 
behavior shuns groundbreaking out-of-the-box articulations and nonquantitative, 
speculative modes of insight. 
 
Backlash against these excesses appears to be much stronger in natural than in social 
sciences. 
                                                 
15
 Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) underscore the elusiveness of society-wide, collective agreements 
regarding such figures.    
16
 Acemoglu and Jarred (2010) analyze the limits to globalization, the intrusion of rev ived nationalistic -
military tensions into international relations, signifying perhaps a new tendency of de-globalization.     
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String theory and other efforts aimed at integrating general relativity and quantum theory, 
for example, may have permanently changed the internal culture of physics. The mindset 
in this domain has become compatible with the arational or apersepctival consciousness 
structure. Gebser identified the emergence of this new (fifth and final) constellation in 
physics through the Einstenian revolution and the development of nuclear science at the 
dawn of the past century (Gebser, 1975, 1984). If abandoning space and an independent, 
segmented time dimension were the hallmarks of the mutation toward arational 
comprehension a hundred years ago, working with open concepts and showing an 
unprecedented readiness to alter, adjust, and renew positions, as well as to tolerate 
competing, alternative ones, characterize the feverish activity around the “theory of 
everything” now.  
 
In sharp contrast, rationalistic rigidity remains firmly ensconced in social sciences, 
especially in economics. Introduced by John Fraser Muth (1961), the “theory of rational 
expectations” is its flagship paradigm. It may have represented a new way to make 
economic phenomena intelligible, but its manifold elaborations over the past two and half 
score years have failed to usher in the acknowledgement that economic growth leaves a 
trace of irreversibly accumulating ecological costs in its wake.17    
 
The general reason for this titanic oversight is that the intellect cannot look at society and 
its problems with the objectivity of an outsider. As pointed out earlier, consideration of 
social problems and their possible solutions remains enclosed within the global system-
determined worldview, a hermeneutic so comprehensive that it seems like an unchanging 
ontological horizon. Thinking keeps reverting to what is generally accepted as being 
“known,” “proven,” “certain,” and “real.”  
 
But there is also a specific reason why rationality as a limiting orientation is so deeply 
ingrained in economic thought. Economics has rationalized what may be considered the 
most salient, empirically observed reflections of rational consciousness. Indeed, there is 
an overlap between rationality in the broadest sense and rationality in economic usage.   
 
Upon hearing that someone has been characterized as “rational,” we tend to think of a 
calculative person who never undertakes an action before comparing the costs it may 
entail with the benefits it is likely to procure; a hard-driving, goal-oriented individual, 
guided more by optimizing self- interest and the desire to accumulate or safeguard 
material wealth than by feelings, emotions, or instincts; someone who wants to absorb as 
much information deemed to be useful to achieve a specific goal as time and cognitive 
capacity permits. In an impulse of dualistic opinion-forming (a critical symptom of 
rational consciousness at Gebser), the lack of these attributes is likely to demote conduct 
to the uncomplimentary status of being “irrational.” 
                                                 
17
 Cu ltivation of the theory of rational expectations (TRE) has led to awarding several Nobel Prizes and 
other high academic d istinctions. It has also provoked visceral criticism. While it is next to impossible to 
select a concise body of references on the subject, Sargent (1971) and Lucas (2008, 1995, 1987, and 1975) 
seem to be good candidates to provide a general idea about TRE’s focus and implicat ions. Dopfer (2005) 
and Common and Stagl (2005) are exa mples of the crit icis m that strikes TRE at its core.        
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The characterization of “rational behavior” in economics, which automatically disregards 
its dualistic complement as unlikely to exist, does not differ essentially and in substance 
from this general perception. It only extends its application to groups of individuals (e.g., 
to households, firms, and nations), which are also presumed to choose courses of action 
according to recognized principles of rationality.    
 
Consequently, traditional economic thought -- neoclassical economics as its currently 
most charismatic genre -- did not invent rational behavior. It has only “rationalized” via 
defining and working with utility and production functions what may be universally 
observed across society and over historical time; that is, the reflections of rational 
consciousness. If rationality poorly captures the repertoire of human behavior (e.g., by 
proxying it through a simplistic “representative” individual, firm, or country), 
rationalizing rationality may well turn out to be a pure l’art pour l’art endeavor -- a  
sacrifice of reality for the sake of unencumbered analysis.18      
 
What was Latin for pre-Enlightenment scholarship is now mathematics for modern 
economics. In both cases, prestige of mastery became the complacent colporteur of false 
relevance. How could the prosecutor’s opinion delivered in flawless Latin in a 16th 
century witch trial not to be correct?  How could an argument about everlasting growth in 
an equilibrium framework, demonstrated through concave majorants of positive functions 
in continuous operator fields, be beside the point?      
   
Traditional thought lives in an inextricable symbiosis with the extant order. Although the 
support it extends in return for being nourished by it comes in many forms, it may be 
classified into four main categories: (a) reducing economic phenomenology to mere 
numbers whose significance is axiomatically presumed to be overwhelming (e.g., GDP 
growth); (b) forcing simple concepts (i.e., homogenous individuals, firms, countries, and 
products) and simple equations (e.g., utility functions and those used in neoclassical 
capital theory) to account for complex phenomena; (c) embracing complexities (e.g., 
searching for nonlinearities) but diagnosing them either as harmless or beneficial for the 
system19; (d) providing continuous assurances that there is nothing new under the sun. 
Anything that happens or can happen has already happened before. If we learn from the 
past, then a reform here, an institutional innovation there will ensure that everything 
remains as is. The body of public comments during and following the 2008 financial 
crisis is a telling example.20  
                                                 
18 Kurt Dopfer offers compelling observations about the limiting nature of canonical assumptions 
concerning prevalent modes of economic rationality in terms of cortical interconnections and neurona l 
functions. Neoclassical economics surreptitiously equates the central character of its inquiry, the homo 
economicus, with a lifeless pocket calculator. See, “Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework” in 
Dopfer (2005). 
19
 See more on this subject under point (5). 
20 How established science remains in the saddle in the face of change and criticism is, of course, not a new 
subject. Applying the thoughts of some of the classics of science philosophy, one might say that 
mainstream economics is “normal science” (Kuhn, 1962). Its “main paradigm” (Kuhn, 1962) is market-
driven economic growth with the government playing a min imal ro le. Thoughts that fit the mainstream may 
also be regarded as the “hard core” (Lakatos, 1980), which defends itself from “scientific revolution” 
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As the rationalizer of rationality, the economics profession has become the ideological 
sword and shield of GS2-style, carrying-capacity- ignoring ecological imperialism. Its 
strenuously novelty-dismissing a-historicity finds expression in resisting change even 
within its own perimeters (see, for example, Krugman, 2009). So far it has succeeded in 
disguising its entrenched orthodoxy through the choice of themes and range of 
considerations, partly by characterizing changes in modeling and expanding 
phenomenological observations within its unecological paradigm as “revolutions,” e.g., 
“the rational expectations revolution,” “the increasing returns revolution.”  
 
In the final analysis, the existential foundations and phenomenology of universal history 
are much broader and more complex than what can be grasped by the rational (i.e., 
contemporary) approach to economic problems. The gap is becoming especially severe 
now as our generation enters into pathologically stressful times of fundamental 
institutional and behavioral transformation.      
 
The species and its sphere   
 
Shortly after World War II, Gebser voiced the danger that the relentless stampede along 
the “more, more, now” path would lead mankind to a self-engineered abyss. He was 
ahead of his time, considering that the environmental and conservation movement with 
international scope could be dated to the 1968 founding of the Club of Rome. Its 
declaration that material resources and the environment represent a life or death challenge 
for humanity is similar in essence to the alarm Gebser sounded two decades earlier.21     
That he had arrived at the indicated conclusion through an “integral” process (systasis) is 
a lesson in humility for those who restrict the possibility of discovering reality to the 
analysis of quantitative information.    
 
The successful application of systasis to the “limits to growth” problem required the 
recognition that (a) external circumstances, in which the majority of individuals are 
embedded, correspond to their inner world, schematically; to the prevalent structure of 
consciousness (point 1); (b) a formal equivalence and numerical exchangeability exist 
among space, time, and energy, and (c) the rational/mental structure is obsessed with 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Kuhn, 1962) -- or from “falsification” in Popperian terms (Popper, 1959) -- by developing “auxiliary 
hypotheses” (Lakatos, 1980) and flexib ly deploying them through “research programs” (Lakatos, 1980). If 
ideation in economics is a response to changes in the socioeconomic environment and if “normal science” 
or  the “hard core” succeeds in defending itself through absorbing, shunting off, or discrediting competing 
theories, which aspire fo r the status of a new “main parad igm” or “hard core,” received wisdom survives by 
adaptation to the basic components of the socioeconomic environment. These remain intact until the next 
seminal gyration or chaotic transition creates a new basin of fundamental structural components (i.e., a 
new global system) in which only relatively insignificant socioeconomic changes occur.  
21
 Georegscu-Roegen’s book The entropy law and the economic process, first published in 1970, marked 
the beginning of debate about the second law among economists. The 1972 publicat ion of Limits to 
Growth, authored by Donella and Dennis Meadows, et al, intensified and spread the debate about resources 
and the environment. The book was subtitled “A report for the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament 
of mankind.” Sustainability became a subject of global discourse in 1983 when the UN General Assembly 
set up the World Commission on Environment and Development . 
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“accumulating space,” forgetting that, since matter fills up space, space also measures 
matter.  
 
Introduction of the concept “ecological footprint,” for which we may thank William E. 
Rees, University of British Columbia, validates Gebser’s assertion by making point (c) 
accessible, transparent, and convincing. 22      
 
The “ecological footprint” is the land and water surface required to maintain the living 
standard of a given population. It is obtained by converting material flows into surface. 
That is, the resources used through consuming goods, and services, housing, and 
transportation as well as the environmental capacity required to absorb the waste 
generated have been translated into space.      
 
The bio-productive “global hectare” is the unit of “ecological footprint.” It is composed 
of crop-, pasture-, and forest land as well as marine fisheries. A comparison can be made 
between a nation’s actual administrative territory and the area it claims (i.e., its ecological 
footprint). Computer routines are available on the Internet for estimating individual-
specific ecological footprints.  
 
According to the 2010 Living Planet Report (found at Business Green.com), the current 
level of global population and economic activities would demand 1.5 times the size of the 
Earth to leave a sustainable ecological footprint. Barring a clear break with fossil- fuel 
dependence and other harmful structural components of our growth-dependent economy, 
the overshoot in terms of space is likely to worsen during the next two decades. If 
“business as usual” expansion continues between now and 2030, humanity will pretend 
that it lives on twice the size of the planet it actually occupies. Clearly, global society is 
liquidating irreplaceable natural capital; it fills up more space than it should if its 
ecological niche is to be preserved. (For a recent complete and detailed survey of 
impending resource shortages, see Diederen, 2010).  
 
(5) The era of large-scale discontinuity is upon us.   
 
A close reading of Gebser allows for the extrapolation that Weltanschauung, ethics, 
intentionality, and norms of average everyday conduct associated with integral 
consciousness mirror a stable, prosperous, and equitable world economy. However, since 
the existence of implied conditions presumes transition from the global system of mixed 
economy/weak multilateralism (GS2) to the one defined as two-level economy/strong 
multilateralism (GS3), the temporal taxonomy evident in Gebser and the one suggested 
by the thermodynamic comprehension of universal history may be regarded as 
theoretically equivalent. The orthogenesis of survival significance for homo sapiens may 
be summed up as GS2/rational consciousness  GS3/integral consciousness. 
 
                                                 
22
 See William E. Rees, “Revisiting Carry ing Capacity: Area-Based Indicators of Sustainability,” in 
Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, Jan. 1996. The art icle’s 
bibliography is a guide to the concept’s genealogy. 
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Obviously, the mutation from rational to integral consciousness and the transition from 
today’s economy to one that provides material welfare and psychic wellbeing without the 
accelerated depletion of natural capital cannot be a simple switchover -- the result of 
suasion and clever reforms (Laszlo, 1994).  
 
Discontinuity darkens the horizon, a chasm on a scale that defies imagination, simply 
because the requisite institutional alterations and massive-scale behavioral 
microevolutions that occurred in the course of the last chaotic transition (i.e., during the 
movement from GS1 to GS2) are thwarted by those needed for GS2  GS3.
 
The reason for invoking Gebser in this context (or, for that matter, any appropriate 
adventitious source) is that economics does not seem to be able to transcend itself, to 
adduce the evidence necessary for the recognition that the world faces a perhaps 
multigenerational macrohistoric tussle during which GS2 must leave the scene in order to 
make place for a new form of global self organization that limits economic expansion in a 
traditional sense.  
 
Standard economic growth theory, a very busy, fast evolving research area, does not 
encompass the possibility of such limitation (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995), and a 
cursory glance at research activities in nonlinear phenomena, the field from which such 
recognition could originate, confirms this opinion.23  
 
Tame chaos, ban catastrophe!  
 
Most of the copious writing on chaos theory’s relevance to the economic sciences has 
circled around the central conviction that equilibrium growth and associated progress in 
material welfare are not in danger. Low-dimensional (read “nonrandom, hence 
deterministic”), self-sustained, endogenous, inter-temporal variations or fluctuations have 
been found to be nonthreatening to bona fide market economies.24 
  
Chaos can be demonstrated either by analytical equations or by data in combination with 
some model.  
 
The first approach is based on showing with algebraic methods that a nonlinear, dynamic 
system of functions, purportedly accurate in describing the economy, is potentially self-
disruptive. That is, it reveals initial-condition sensitivity and moves the system toward a 
“strange attractor.”  
 
Although the mathematical methodology of the prevalent orthodoxy allows endogenously 
arising fluctuations with deterministic structures (without shying away from the 
identification of “unstable” time evolutions in phase diagrams), the boundary conditions 
                                                 
23
 For a thorough survey of discontinuities in the economic process, see Rosser (1991).   
24 For reports on actual calculations, complete with historical notes, comparisons, evaluations, and an 
extensive list of references, see Shintani and Linton (2001), Rosser and Kramer (1999), Benhabib  (1992), 
and Baumol and Benhabib (1989).  
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inherent in standard theory always eliminate their significance. The argument between 
those who claim that automatic self-equilibration (i.e., convergence toward “Walrasian 
equilibrium”) is sufficient and those who maintain that Keynesian-style intervention is a 
“must” is internal to the teleology of everlasting expansion. The two sides of this political 
dialectic are united in the reassuring synthesis whereby the worst that can happen as a 
result of bifurcation is an unexpected steady state solution.   
 
The second avenue entails the requirement to prove that the time series of a relevant 
economic phenomenon or quantity (e.g., real growth, investment, consumption, monetary 
aggregates, stock values) are nonlinear, then showing (usually through reliance on some 
nonparametric estimator such as “neural network” models where the data are allowed to 
define the functional form) that they contain a deterministic pattern.  
 
Studies following this avenue have underscored the presence of nonlinearities in 
aggregate time series but did not reveal anything dramatic. Within their reasonable range, 
parameters (e.g., labor’s share in a customary production function, capital/labor ratio, 
discount factor), the model of differential equations describing economic evolution 
reveals globally asymptotic behavior. The conclusion is again that there is no chaos in the 
data (even if they turn out to be nonlinear) or that the chaos found is harmless or that 
chaos as a methodology is not useful in the study of a well- functioning market economy.   
 
All in all, innocuously small developments will never cascade into a naked singularity in 
the form of some generalized structural breakdown. Even if the time paths identified do 
not converge to a point or a stable periodic attractor, or to some limit cycle, they remain 
bounded. By what? Perhaps by ergodicity25 dyed into the pith of reality or because 
Natura non facit saltum; announcing the triumphant return of the poltergeist of an earlier 
diaphaneity, championed by Leibniz, Darwin, and Alfred Marshall.     
 
One may even venture to say that the study of chaos in the mainstream has system-
bolstering implications because it implies in toto that the determinism associated with it 
iodizes the time-reversal asymmetry of nonlinearity. 
 
Recurrence, the indelible signature of determinism, trumps the ferment of disorder 
through unidirectional transformations (what time-reversal asymmetry actually means). It 
bootlegs reversibility in a broad sense, essentially underscoring intrinsic stability. As if 
nonlinearity posited the null-hypothesis that the prevailing institutions are transitory (i.e., 
drastically changing conditions may give birth to self-propagated structural instability, 
ending perhaps in a complete systems failure) that the deterministic pattern of chaos 
could safely reject. Once a pattern has been identified, economic agents and policymakers 
could take rational countermeasures to avoid disruptions, dampen boom/bust vacillations, 
and eliminate all harmful epiphenomena of chaotic dynamics.   
 
In contrast to the way chaos has been applied to examine the economic organization’s 
resilience, catastrophe theory offers a direct way to search for bifurcations that could 
result in comprehensive discontinuity.  
                                                 
25
 For abuses of the term, see Georgescu-Roegen (1971). 
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Catastrophe enjoyed some vogue following the 1973 OPEC oil embargo but became a 
derided heresy by the late 70s (Rosser, 2007).26 Indeed, it came as close to being 
excommunicated from the university as the economics-theology parallel (as introduced 
by Nelson, 2001) permits the metaphor.27  
 
In summary, deterministic nonlinear processes pose no danger to the global economy’s 
self-sustained, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. The system has no inherent 
tendency toward eliminating itself. 
 
The deterministic pattern, if it can be detected at all, is cyclical, moderate, could very 
well be positive (e.g., attributable to innovation) and is subject to control. This opinion 
has been found unassailably robust. It is considered a commonplace truth; questioning it 
is not comme il faux.28  
 
Experience and the ontological prejudice of rationality limit the range of predictions.    
 
The integral perception of conservative natural resource data, the second law, and GS2’s 
inability to ensure seamless substitution away from scarce natural resources suggests that 
clustering energy and material input scarcities and/or some environmental disaster will 
interrupt world economic growth within our generation’s time horizon. From this vantage 
point, mainstream tragically fails to come to grips with the whole truth. The answer to the 
obvious question “Why is this case?” is twofold: experience and ideology.     
       
If we smooth out time series through moving averages and consider occasional 
downturns (“the business cycle”) par for the course, the world economy has exhibited a 
unique period of stability since World War II. Under these circumstances, there is no 
underlying, general reason why data or analytical equations rooted in observed stability 
ought to signal systems failure.     
 
The global system-accompanying ideology lives in perfect harmony with this reassuring 
experience. It comes with axiomatic assumptions about human behavior, desires, and an 
unshakeable confidence in reality being moldable putty by appropriately focused rational 
minds.      
                                                 
26
 As of this writ ing, not even the most thoroughgoing mainstream analyses envisage the rising marginal 
cost of oil to bring down the global economic system or consider the phenomenon known as “peak oil” a 
real and present danger. See, for example El-Gamal and Jaffe (2010). For a more realistic assessment of the 
world’s oil predicament see Deffeyes (2010) and the following art icles in the Post -Carbon Institute’s 
Energy Bulletin:  http://www.energybulletin.net/50503 and http://energybulletin.net/node/46223. 
27 Even less potentially damaging nonlinear phenomena are often attributed to some form of 
“imperfect ion” (such as in markets, foresight, or government policy) -- the quoted word evoking faith-
based examinations. Economists have cited “Heterogeneous beliefs” as a condition that may lead to chaotic 
dynamics (Brock and Hommes, 1998).  
28
 Nevertheless, the possibility of epochal chaos (i.e., disruption on a scale far beyond what tradition-
motivated economic research allows into the realm of possibilities) has p reoccupied historians for decades 
(McCloskey, 1991; Reisch, 1991) and has intrigued physicists willing to venture into social and economic 




The established creed impregnates presuppositions, which, in turn, give birth to an 
interminable flow of theses reflecting the father’s genes. As a consequence, the mental 
habits of transduction associated with ad infinitum output maximization (exponential 
growth) prevent creative induction to the effect that this fixed idea has an expiration date 
stamped on its back. Even radically alarming assessments see a way of skipping chaotic 
transition and moving to a much more sustainable, green economy.29  
 
The ancient Greeks were onto something by believing that order in the world arises from 




Synopsis of world history as the narrative version of thermodynamic unfolding 30 
 
The thermodynamic process that characterizes the human story (cultural evolution, 
universal history) is ecologically dissipative, hence irreversible by the second law of 
thermodynamics. The requirement of growing degrees of self-organization renders it 
pulsatile.31 The dissipative expansion of self-organized physical entities must go through 
dynamic steady states (global systems) interrupted by bifurcations (chaotic transitions), 
episodes during which parameters for the next dynamic steady state are selected and 
introduced. 
 
The global system is the planet’s broadest and most comprehensive framework for 
socioeconomic institutions and behavior. It is the result of implicit collaboration at the 
species’ level. In strictly physical terms, it may be viewed as a dynamic steady state of 
billions of interconnected neuroanatomical states.   
 
During 1500-1789 (GS0), the world underwent sweeping changes as preparations for the 
age of global systems accelerated. European explorations and colonization nearly 
completed geographic globalization. Modern scientific thinking emerged and vital 
discoveries were made in physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, and astronomy. The 
ideas of all-embracing individual liberty and freedom of conscience, and the concept of 
“nation” as a form of sovereign territorial organization were born. The Enlightenment has 
gone a long way in prying the frozen fingers of dogmatic thinking from the human mind 
and identifying the project of social progress. The epoch produced unmatched 
achievements in the arts.  
 
                                                 
29
 The work of former U.S. Vice President Al Gore exemplifies the widespread view that the mobilization 
of “polit ical will” through enlightening society would suffice to avoid economic discontinuity and/or 
environmental catastrophe while p reserving the trend of perpetually growing material plentitude (Gore, 
2006, 2009). Diederen (2010) provides a much more realistic basis to conclude that the opportunity for a 
“painless transition” has been passed and the only happy ending in sight is, indeed, a frugal one.  
30
 For full length exposition, see Pogany (2006).  
31
 Based on the work of Nobel Laureate chemist Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine, 1997), this theory had been 
applied to world history by Erv in Laszlo (Laszlo, 1991).  
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As the ensemble of particles (human biomass plus all human crafted objects) grew, its 
size had to reach the point where it required global-scale organization in order to grow 
further. Laissez faire/metal money/zero multilateralism -- by its full name, abbreviated as 
GS1-- was the first global system, with Great Britain as its epicenter. It lasted from the 
1830s (Polanyi, 1957) to the outbreak of World War I.  
 
Despite its well-known success in raising per capita output for a growing population, GS1 
became increasingly unable to accommodate further economic development. Its main 
limitations may be summarized under four points.  
 
(1) Dependence on gold limited the supply of money; (2) while industrialization reached 
the level at which national economies were prone to accelerate and decelerate if left on 
their own, system parameters did not include instruments (i.e., fiscal and monetary 
policies) to counter this phenomenon; (3) the system skewed distribution too much in 
favor of capital at the expense of labor, thereby constraining the development of mass 
consumption/mass production; and (4) it was unfit to accommodate institutions or 
schemes for international cooperation required by growing economic and financial 
interdependence among national economies.  
 
By 1914, initial-condition sensitivity hid in the incongruity between system parameters 
and the state of the world. The “Guns of August” blew GS1 to smithereens.  
 
The period 1914-1945 was the chaotic transition that led to the introduction of the second 
and current global system, called (by its full name) mixed economy/ fiat money/weak 
multilateralism (GS2). As observed in thermodynamic processes via bifurcation, diverse 
and intensely conflicting approaches emerged to reestablish order (i.e., a dynamic steady 
state).  
 
These were the alternatives: (1) Restoration of GS1 by attempting to bring back the gold 
standard; (2) Communism: A new form of socioeconomic self-organization; (3) Fascism: 
Territorial conquest through military aggression, winner takes all (semi-colonial or 
colonial status for the rest of the world); and (4) Mixed economy: A new relationship 
between public authority and the market as well as between labor and capital.     
 
Mixed economy triumphed.  
 
The critical transformation realized during the New Deal in the United States quickly 
spread to industrial democracies following World War II, becoming the backbone of 
GS2’s domestic economic organization. It implies a private-ownership-based market 
economy with important roles assigned to the state in securing economic prosperity and 
social peace.   
 
The United Nations and its charter organizations represent weak multilateralism. Its 
flagship agencies in the economic and financial sphere are The World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The United 
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States took the role of epicenter or “world leader” from Great Britain, upgraded with 
system administrator- like functions. 
 
GS2 outshined and outperformed GS1. It brought material welfare within the reach of 
billions. During the threescore years from 1950 to 2010, despite an increase in world 
population from 2.5 billion to 6.9 billion, per capita global output (income) increased 
more than four-fold.32 
 
Schematically, the chart below depicts the structure of world history (or the “archeology” 
of the current world order): 
 
GS0 (1500-1789)       GS1 (1834-1914)      GS2 (1945-present)      
Late feudalism/  Laissez faire/         Mixed economy / 
early capitalism   metal money         weak multilateralism  
 
Communism: Less than a global system but more than a footnote 
  
Recognition of the above-presented perspective had to wait for the collapse of 
communism. During the Cold War, global society accepted the notion that there were two 
parallel, competing global systems vying for domination. Planet-wide self-organization 
appeared to be bi-systemic. In retrospect, Communism was not and could not have 
become a global system :  
 
(1) To avoid isolation, communist-controlled countries had to deal with the rest of the 
world through GS2’s multilateral institutions dominated by industrial democracies; (2) 
The Soviet Bloc, representing the “developed socialist world” during the Cold War, 
accounted for 5 percent or less of global trade; (3) The communistic social order appealed 
only to a small minority of the world population and this circumstance disqualified it 
from becoming the foundation of a new global order; (4) Socialist societies did not 
develop distinct socioeconomic personal traits. They only suppressed and deformed GS2-
typical behavior. (Populations formerly under communist rule snapped out from socialist 
institutions and immediately adopted multiparty, private entrepreneurship-based 
economic organizations, roughly at their respective pre-communist level of social 
development.)  
 
This is not to deny or even belittle the historic significance of Communism. Its early 
economic growth performance and proclaimed idealism presented the rest of the world 
with a major political challenge. 
 
As a balance wheel, the communist threat helped define the respective weights (“the 
mix”) of private and public expenditures in the mixed economy. It pushed the balance in 
favor of public expenditures (e.g., military spending in the United States, social programs 
in Western Europe and Japan). 
 
                                                 
32
 Estimates based on historical data published on line by The World Bank, and on IMF project ions for 
2010. 
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We can acknowledge this by observing that a restriction of public authority followed the 
catastrophic demise of socialist statehood. The era since 1991 has witnessed a forceful 
wave of deregulations and privatizations. During its existence, the communist sphere 
provided the socio-psychological, philosophical prop needed to prevent the real 
hegemonic world order (GS2) from acquiring ontological status; i.e., its attributes 
becoming confused with natural laws beyond human control. Since 1991, environmental 
and anti-globalization movements have become the main sources of highlighting GS2’s 
shortcomings, i.e., its existence as a historic form of self-organization. 
 
Given that communism was not a global system, we may conclude that, thus far, the 
sequence “GS0GS1GS2” best describes the thermodynamic process we regard as 
universal history. The following synaptic table summarizes the main characteristics of 
these organizational stages.   
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What is next? 
 
But now the ticking of the evolutionary time machine heralds the onset of a new 
transition. The reason is not, as Marx thought, that capitalism (now in its modern or 
reformed version) could not provide prosperity for the masses, or that it suffered from 
incurable limitations in ensuring economic expansion. The reason is the exact opposite: 
GS2 cannot stop growing. Its existence is conditioned on the maximum growth 
achievable and, therefore, it is incompatible with a predominantly renewable-resource 
based global society in agreement about the use of scarce, nonrenewable resources and 
the environment. The terrestrial sphere’s ability to support unbridled economic growth is 
limited and we are approaching the limits.  
 
The thermodynamic interpretation of global history predicts a halt to population and 
economic expansion for purely physical reasons.   
  
Long-term world equilibrium -- GS3 
 
As the world’s growing population and economy encounter terrestrial limits, a new 
global system, called two-level economy/strong multilateralism will be needed.  
 
On one level, activities that depend heavily on nonrenewable natural resources and put 
the environment at risk would be subject to globally-determined constraints. These 
activities would be allocated to nations and transnationally-dominated sectors such as the 
petrochemical and automobile industries. On the other level, it would be “business as 
usual” market economy.  
 
Strong multilateralism implies some form of democratically organized world governance, 
complete with a global central bank, global currency, and global minimum wage. 
 
The world currency would combine the discipline GS1’s gold standard vouchsafed and 
the flexibility GS2’s fiat money has provided (without the fractional reserve system, 
which, as will become obvious during the first half of the 21st century, is wholly 
incompatible with any consciously pursued economic steady state.) Much along the lines 
proposed by Keynes at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, an international clearing 
house would keep cross-border trade in equilibrium.          
 
There would be a framework of close cooperation in space engineering and colonization.  
 
Comparing a world that can muster the will to cooperate at such an intense level with the 
one that lived through the past century and the first decade of the new one gives us pause. 
If it took “1914-1945” to move from GS1 to GS2, what will it take to accomplish the 
much more drastic transformation implied by GS2  GS3?  
 
While in different terms, Gebser awakens the same fears, the coming- to-the-fore of our 
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